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BOOK REVIEW
Method of Interpretationand Sources of Private Positive Law
(Mgthode d'Interpretationet Sources en Droit Priv6 Positif),
(2d ed.) by Frangois Gdny. Translated into English by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, with a critical introduction
by Jaro Mayda. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1963. Pp.
cxviii, 624. $20.00.*
The original contribution of Frangois G~ny to the science or
philosophy of law is widely recognized among scholars throughout the world.' Due to the language barrier, however, exposure
to G6ny's thinking has until now been limited in American jurisdictions, since only fragments of his work were available in
English translation. The Louisiana State Law Institute has performed another fine service by sponsoring the translation of
Gny's major work, Method of Interpretation and Sources of
Private Positive Law. Through its greater availability to American lawyers, Gny's Method of Interpretationmay have longrange impact on American, and particularly Louisiana, legal
thought, as it did in France itself, by furnishing another dimension to studies in the argument and decision of legal issues for
which legislation has not explicitly provided.
"METHOD OF INTERPRETATION" AND FRAN OIS GI9NY

Frangois G6ny was born in 1861 near Nancy in the AlsaceLorraine region of France. He died in Nancy in 1959, at the age
of ninety-eight, having spent almost his whole lifetime in that
area. He was a Professor and Dean of Law from 1885 until he
retired in 1931, serving at the University of Nancy from 19011931, as Dean of Law there from 1919-1925.
His Method of Interpretationand Sources of Private Positive
Law was first published in one volume in 1899, when G~ny was
thirty-eight years of age. The work was revised and reprinted
in two volumes in 1919. The revised edition contained no change
*Remarks delivered at the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Louisiana

State Law Institute, March 13, 1964, Alexandria, Louisiana.
1. See, e.g., DARIN, LE CENTENAIRE DU DOYEN FRANgOIS GitNY (1963);
STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW ch. 7 (1961) ; 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 181-84 (1949) ; FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY passim, especially 284

(1960) ; Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine,
and Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 235, 242-43 (1958).
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in the original text, but G6ny's ideas were sharpened somewhat
in the revision of the footnotes. However, the 1919 revision also
included an epilogue of four chapters critically commenting upon
various developments in theories of legal interpretation which
occurred after publication of the 1899 text. A second edition of
this 1919 text was published in 1954, shortly before G6ny's
death, with G~ny himself, then aged ninety-three, assisting in
the final reprint. The Law Institute translation is of this second or 1954 edition of the 1919 revision.
G6ny was the author of many other legal works, most noted
of which is his four-volume treatise, Science et Technique en
Droit Privd Positif (Elements and Technique in Private Positive
Law), published by volume between 1914 and 1924. This work
developed and made more explicit the themes of Method of Interpretation.
In his Method of Interpretation,G6ny is not primarily interested in abstract legal theory. Rather, he has the purpose of
analyzing, for practical use in decision-making, what considerations should be binding upon a judge in deciding a case, and
what should be merely discretionary. G~ny recognizes that the
judge must decide cases in accordance with formal law where it
is truly applicable. However, he seeks to delimit precisely the
circumference of the legislative intent of a statute, within which
the purely legislative directive is mandatory. Then, he attempts
to set forth an objective method by which the judge may decide
cases where legislation has not directly provided a law-rule to
apply. Crucial to G6ny's original conception of method is what
he calls libre recherche scientifique - literally translated, "free
scientific research." The concept is that of free search (that is,
uncontrolled by formal law) for the elements from which to construct a decisional rule, based upon objective elements of law
and society capable of being pragmatically verified or dis2
proved.
The rather formidable title is merely descriptive. The
"method of interpretation" and the "sources" sought are limited to the area of "private" law, where the private interests of
citizens inter se are primarily involved, and to "positive" law,
2.
LAW

G1 NY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE
(MITHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVIP POSITIF) x-xii

(2d ed., transl. by La. St. L. Inst. 1963). Footnote citations to the subject work
will hereafter simply indicate the page number of any references to this edition.
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consisting of the rules enacted or adopted or applied by proper
authority of the government of an organized society. Yet G6ny
indicates that his method of analysis is valid in other fields of
law also; he restricts his discussion merely to make it more manageable.
The work opens with a description and analysis of what Gny
calls the "traditional" method of ascertaining the applicable legal rule. In the second part, he exposes the fallacies, weaknesses, and dangers in this traditional method. Finally, he sets forth
a preferred method of interpretation, together with a systematic
doctrine of the sources to be used, which he claims to be a more
objective and more realistic method than the traditional one for
assisting the courts to settle disputes.
CRITIQUE OF THE "TRADITIONAL"

METHOD

In civilian jurisdictions such as Louisiana, where the bulk
of private law is codified, the traditional method of finding the
applicable legal rule is through the actual or presumed intent
of the legislators. Gny points out that legislation is actually
adopted by a group of human beings to apply to a contemporary
problem or social scene. However, legislation can never be allinclusive. It is impossible for the legislators to conceive of every
possible variation of facts. Perhaps as important, the social
conditions which the legislation is designed to regulate are in
the process of constant evolution.
The author suggests that it is fictitious to ascribe any actual
intention to the real legislators, when we interpret a statute to
apply it to later or different type-situations than those the original statute was specifically designed to regulate. We, the interpreters, may infer that the legislators would have provided a
similar rule for the new type-situation, which we, the interpreters, now choose to classify as similar to that actually legislated
for. But it is we who make this inference, not the legislators.
The author points out that it is also a fiction, with regard to
actual legislative intent, to presume that we are accomplishing
the same statutory purpose, or that we are applying an earlier
statute to a different situation in a later era in the same manner as the earlier legislators would (that is, might) have, had
they foreseen it. In fact, it is we, the later interpreters, and not
the elected law-makers, who are expanding the original purpose
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and scope of the earlier statute so as to regulate a later and different situation which was not within the actually intended
purview of the statute.
G~ny agrees that, in general, the functional or objective
method of interpretation, by applying a presumed legislative intent, does accomplish a useful purpose. It stretches the old legislation so as to cover new type-situations, without constant resort
to legislative revision or re-enactment, which as a practical matter would be impossible. He urges, however, that we recognize
the fiction as such, and goes on to warn us of at least two dangers.
In the first place, by holding ourselves to a legislative text
not specifically intended to apply, we are arbitrarily straitjacketing legal reasoning. By so restricting the frame of initial
reference we are limiting the choice of rules that might reasonably be applied to the new type-situation, although in fact the
legislators did not consider regulating it and did not actually
intend the old legislative rule to have the effect of limiting judicial reasoning.
In the second place, G6ny suggests, the common restriction
of judicial reference to the legislative text usually results in the
erection of logical abstractions as the presumed basis of all deductions from the legislative rule. These abstract concepts are
useful work tools to apply the legislation to the type-situation
for which it was designed. However, when we use these abstract
concepts to regulate new or different type-situations, we apply
an artificial rule designed by the interpreter, not the legislator.
Such a rule is not itself tied to reality by having been enacted
for an existing social condition; it is formulated and applied on
the basis of word-logic, without any attention to the fundamental
purposes of legal rules, social utility, and fairness.. These criteria are not, at least ostensibly, regarded in the "traditional"
view as factors to be weighed in the formulation of the rule.
In applying an artificial rule so deduced, the interpreters
themselves supply a "legislative" rule which is not in fact founded upon the will and authority of the legislature itself, but is
instead formulated on the basis of abstract concepts not grounded in social life. In so doing, G~ny says, the interpreters or
judges themselves exercise legislative powers by devising the
new rule for the new type-situation; and, worse, they do so
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blindly and without ostensible consideration of the practical
utility and fairness of the rule thus derived, ignoring the very
criteria which should be the fundamental bases for the formulation of any legislative rule to apply in a living society.
CRITIQUE OF GANY'S METHOD
What different approach, then, does Gdny suggest?
The problem in a civilian jurisdiction is, he says, "to determine how the powers and functions in the field of formulation
and application of legal concepts should be distributed between
the legislation and the jurisprudence, between the function of
determining in abstracto the rules of law and that of putting
' '3
them into practice and applying them in concreto.
In summary, G6ny feels that an interpreter or judge in deciding a case must apply (1) any rule furnished by written law
actually applicable, (2) if none, any custom applicable (and he
defines custom more broadly than many of us do), and (3) if
neither written law nor custom directly furnishes the applicable
rule, then the interpreter must engage in what he calls a "free
objective search for rules" (libre recherche scientifique).4
The latter is a process by which the interpreter or judge is
frankly recognized as having responsible discretion to applywhere written law is silent- a rule of his own devising, consonant with the ends of justice and the practical needs of society.
GUny points out that by the traditional method of interpretation
also, the judge has discretion in the inference or deductions he
may make in the interpretation of the so-called legislative "intent" where the statute itself is silent; but, he suggests, this
"traditional" discretion is actually more subjective in practice
than that by his method, since the ostensible bases for the exercise of "traditional" discretion are not related to social needs
and consequences but exist only in the mind of the judge or
interpreter.
3. P. 71.
4. At p. 517 (in the 1919 epilogue), G~ny says that article 1 of the Swiss
Code of 1907 (which was adopted independently of G~ny's influence but after
publication of his Method of Interpretation in 1899) was the best summary of
his arguments. This code article provides: "The statute governs all the matters
within the letter or spirit of any of its provisions. In the absence of any applicable statutory provisions, the judge shall decide according to customary law,
and in its absence according to rules he would enact as a legislator. In this he
shall follow the established doctrine and decisional law."
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Basically, then, G~ny agrees that formal written law must be
binding upon the judge-interpreter, if such law is reasonably designed to apply to the particular type-situation now to be decided. G6ny insists, however, that in applying the statute as a
binding directive we must not go beyond the specific and subjective intent of the legislators at the time the statute was enacted: the legislative rule must be applied to accomplish only the
specific purpose and to regulate only the specific type-situation
the real legislators had in mind when they enacted the statute.
Otherwise, a statute grounded in justice and utility for one sort
of situation may fail to achieve these ends when misapplied to a
different and later type-situation.
However, it should be noted that G~ny does not disapprove
of new rules deduced intellectually from statutes initially designed specifically for other purposes. He simply says that, in
so deducing a new rule, we must frankly recognize that we as
judge-interpreters are acting on our own and are not carrying
out any legislative intent. The importance in the distinction is
that, while we must apply legislative intent (irrespective of
whether the general rule produces results which seem fair to the
interpreter), we are not so bound when the rule is devised merely from doctrine or interpretation rather than from actual legislative intent. Therefore, application of the new rule derived
from interpretation (not legislation) may be evaluated in the
light of its general fairness and utility; the judge-interpreter
has complete discretion not to apply the new rule if it fails to
meet these fundamental tests; and, if it so fails, the interpreter
then may, if need be, formulate a new rule from objective
sources other than the statute itself.
If no imperative written law is applicable, G~ny says, the
only other source of binding and unquestionable rule is that of
"custom." This custom must be based upon (a) usage in fact,
that is, upon a course of social conduct, plus (b) the conviction
of the persons involved that the usage is binding under the sanction of law. He points out that customs arising from usage unrelated to formal law are playing less and less important a part
in the mobile population of today's civilization with its rapidly
changing industrial society, although custom from ancient times
was the parent of much of today's written law. However, G~ny
suggests that another sort of binding custom is of growing importance in today's world: the custom of judicial decisions and
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legal doctrines, upon which people actually rely in their day-today dealings, with the conviction that such usage represents
binding law. That is, although the decisions and legal doctrines
upon which the customs are based may not be grounded upon
actual legislative intent, nevertheless the common consent to the
custom as a binding regulation, with the social conduct in reliance upon it, secure for this custom a binding authority which
the courts must without discretion apply in relevant fact-situations within its scope.
Aside from written law and custom, G~ny recognizes no other
sources of authority as truly binding upon the judge-interpreter.
Legal decisions or doctrines which have not acquired the force
of a custom by producing social conduct in reliance upon them,
are, Gdny says, merely persuasive as one of the sources, although
perhaps one of the most important, upon which the judges may
draw in deciding a concrete case now before them, in instances
when an applicable binding rule is not directly furnished by
statute or by custom.
Finally, when binding statute or custom does not provide the
rule to apply to decide the concrete case before him, the judge
should then decide the case by roughly the same considerations
as those which influence a legislator in adopting a written statute. The rule so adopted should therefore be grounded upon its
practical usefulness in accordance with the "norm of living life,"
and in accordance with concepts of justice and fairness which
dominate all Western countries.
Law is not reduced to the level of subjective impressionism
on the part of the interpreter, Gny says, when we recognize
frankly that the interpreter has discretion to find the applicable
rule, by the "free objective search for rules" (libre recherche
8cientifique).
In the first place, this free search by the interpreter for a
rule is really just "an emergency method, which is a necessary
part of any complete legal system" 5 to fill in the gaps where
written law does not provide an appropriate rule which is binding. Gny thus indicates that this "free search" method is only
necessary in a small minority of cases, since in the great majority of cases we are furnished binding or all-persuasive rules
5. P. 493.
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by formal authorities. In a 1961 law review article the late
Judge Charles Clark of the United States Second Circuit estimated that only approximately ten percent of the cases in his
high appellate court permitted discretion for the judge to determine by social value which was the most preferable legal rule
estito apply to resolve the dispute then before the court -an
mate, he pointed out, which was similar to Justice Cardozo's. 6
In the second place, G6ny felt that the discretion of the interpreter was not unlimited. By the method of interpretation
advocated by him, certain objective sources provide the rules
which interpreters should appiy. In applying these formal
sources under the free search method, the rule derived from
these formal sources should be weighed to determine whether
its application is justified by its practical utility and fairness
in the type-situation then before the court. This new rule should
be based on "the needs that result from the nature of the mat'7
ters and the conditions of life."
When formal law authority does not provide the rule, G~ny
says that the judge should adopt "an independent scientific procedure" by scrutinizing "the objective nature of things" and
searching for "the balance of interests" practically affected,
rather than finding the rule "by means of a forced interpretation of statutory texts."8 He explained that "law ought to be
discovered in the realities of social life," and that the aim of
the judge is to discover the deeper realities upon which even the
formal sources of law are based, in order to find the correct rule
to apply where written law is silent.
G6ny summarizes the judge's mission as follows: "How else
can this inquiry be conducted if not through an investigation
of our moral nature, a scrutiny of the principles of our political
organization, penetration of the needs of our economic order, so
as to find out the superior rules which express the conditions
vital for our society at the present time, and which should therefore govern the individual will ?"1o
The positive sources from which the judge should draw, G~ny
says, in his effort to secure "justice and social usefulness
6. Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom
in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256 (1961).
7. P. 142.
8. P. 420.
9. P. 493.
10. P. 424.
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through an appropriate rule,"" and in an effort to base the rule
upon the nature of things, remembering that "the purpose creates all law,"'1 2 are as follows:
First of all, by analogy we may draw from existing written
law and customs. We seek the fundamental principle upon which
an existing formal law is based, to derive from it a new rule,
which, if it meets the test of justice and social utility, will then
accord with the underlying legal thrust for equality before the
law: that is, that similar fact-situations should be governed by
the same general legal sanctions and principles. (By analogy,
of course, we either deduce a general rule from a special text;
or, from a general rule applicable to other situations, deduce by
analogy a rule which is adaptable to a new type-situation and
based upon the same legislative concepts as motivate the original statute.) But it should be remembered that the rule thus
derived by analogy from written law can only be regarded as a
rule which the legislators themselves did not provide as a binding directive, and which therefore may be discarded by the
judge-interpreter if, as a general regulation, it does not meet
the legislative tests of social fairness and utility.
Next, outside of the persuasive sources found in the formal
legal system itself - represented by analogy from statute and
by court decisions - G6ny suggests that we should also take into
consideration other extra-legal elements in the formulation of
the rule to decide the unprovided-for case before us, such as:
the ethical make-up and religious organization of the jural society in which the rule is to be applied, so that the rule adopted
should be generally consistent with such ethical and religious
ideals; the political structure and the political ideas upon which
the society is founded, which represent a social force with which
the legal rules should be consistent; the economic structure of
the society, which in our Western civilizations includes the principles of private property, freedom of contract, and the succession of heirs to the property of their decedent; and the contemporary social organization of which judicial practice is only one
component, insofar as the organization reveals a state of order
and equilibrium with which the contemporary legal rules should
accord, and to which historical and sociological considerations
are pertinent.' 3
11. P. 354.
12. P. 363.
13. Pp. 391o99.
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We must do our best, G~ny says, to extract the essence from
the pattern of human institutions, for the whole life of society
should be the source of a legal rule rather than sterile logic
which merely affords the deduction of abstract principles that
are not necessarily based upon their social utility.
G~ny concludes that, in order to maintain the balance of social interests which must be a fundamental guide to the interpretation of law, the interpreter should (1) recognize the legal
interests actually involved in the situation, (2) evaluate their
relative force, (3) weigh them to discover those interests of the
greatest social importance, and (4) establish a rule which is in
accord with the most desirable balance of the different interests
involved.
The present reviewer's discussion of G6ny's method of judicial interpretation has no doubt imperfectly and incompletely
explained his thought. Further, it cannot be as interesting in
the abstract, as described in this review, as it is in the text itself through G~ny's development of his thesis by concrete illustrations, which bring home to the reader the force of his reasoning. For the reviewer, G~ny's analysis and suggested method
was not just an X-ray showing the internal arrangement of the
legal system; it was more a sort of stethoscope, catching the
living beat of the law in action.
THE TRANSLATOR AND

HIs

INTRODUCTION

This review should not be closed without comment on the
really excellent and readable translation accomplished for the
Law Institute by Professor Jaro Mayda of the Law School of
the University of Puerto Rico. Professor Mayda, a native of
Czechoslovakia who has taught law both in that country and in
this, is an authority in the field of comparative law.
Professor Mayda's contribution includes an excellent eightypage critical introduction. This introduction enables us to view
G~ny's work in the context of his times and of general legal theory, and with some perspective on subsequent and comparative
legal developments. For this reason, the introduction should be
read before reading G6ny's work proper, even though, for a nonspecialist such as the reviewer, the introduction is somewhat
heavy reading due to the heavy concentration of legal thought
in it.
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Also, in suggesting to a non-specialist reader how best to
enjoy Method of Interpretation,the reviewer is inclined to add
that G~ny's footnotes may be ignored without great loss by such
a reader. For a specialist, they no doubt sharpen and illuminate
CGny's thought; but they are often heavy going for the general
reader, without adding much to his appreciation of the text itself.
CONCLUSION
As a final observation, we should discuss the possible query
by a busy contemporary practitioner or judge: what practical
value can there be for me in 1965 to read G~ny's work?
I can only say for myself that G6ny's analysis and the clarity of his ideas have exposed to me much more clearly and explicitly currents and values in judicial decision which generally
we think of, if we recognize them at all, only as silent and unconscious influences upon the direction of the development of
law. GUny's approach calls for frank and explicit recognition in
a formal and open way of these decisional forces, so as the better to control and utilize them objectively.
I do not believe I am disclosing any secrets of the conference
which have. not been described by judges far more able and articulate and prominent than myself, when I say that the decision
of close legal questions often involves more than the logical or
mechanical application of prior recognized legal rules. Where
explicit law does not provide direct guidance, decision often
must involve in addition a value-judgment, based, whether consciously or unconsciously, upon the very elements of practical
utility and fairness which G~ny emphasizes are the mainspring
of all law.
Perhaps, as CGny suggests, frank and open recognition of
this discretionary element in the decisional process might actually limit potential subjectivism on the part of the judges if judicial discretion is openly exercised, where permitted by a legislative hiatus; but only through some formal system such as GUny
suggests. This approach might furnish a more intellectual and
objective basis for decision-making, as compared with using the
discretionary elements of decision-making unconsciously or by
blind instinct, or under the delusion that the use of word-logic
is the sole basis of decision when actually the issue calls for a
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discretionary selection between values. This approach might also
permit the practicing bar to organize the proof and argument of
their cases in conformity with the actual bases upon which they
are to be decided, rather than to satisfy imaginary artificial concepts, the application of which only seems to be dictated by logic
but which actually (unless the judge himself is mechanically
applying rules without regard to their purpose) are selected as
applicable only because of the fair and useful general results
4
they will produce.1
In any event, Gdny's analysis of the discretionary element in
judicial decision-making is as valid today as it was when he
wrote it in 1899, as is his critical analysis of any method of
judicial interpretation which pretends to deny it. Likewise as
timely is G~ny's call for more explicit recognition that sometimes
policy factors are necessarily basic elements in decision-making.
Albert Tate, Jr.**
14. It should again be emphasized that Gdny's "free objective search for rules,"
as well as the observations in this paragraph of the text, are intended to apply
only to the relatively small proportion of cases to be decided where the legislature
or formal law does not provide a rule intended to govern the decision and where
therefore the court has discretion in the selection of the rule to apply to decide
the case. See also text at notes 5 and 6 supra.
**Judge, Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

